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STUDENT COMMENTS
A CIVIL SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM OF ORGANIZED
CRIME-THE FLORIDA APPROACH
The existence of organized crime in America, and the threat it
poses to the nation's economic, political and legal institutions, is an
established fact.' One particularly troublesome aspect of the growth
of organized crime is its investment in, and operation of, "legitimate"
businesses.' The undesirable result of this penetration is that the
American commercial system is being used to provide a "cover" for
illegal activities,' a repository for illegally acquired funds,' and access
to sources of illegal activities. 8
In July of 1969, the Florida Legislature, acknowledging that the
existing criminal laws were not successfully containing the expansion
of organized crime,° decided to attack the problem from a new angle.
The legislature enacted a statute' which empowers the Attorney
General to institute civil proceedings designed to revoke the charter
of a corporation or to enjoin the operation of a business in three dis-
tinct situations. First, the corporate charter may be forfeited when
1 Special Senate Comm. to Investigate Organized Crime in Interstate Commerce,
Third Interim Report 171 (1951) [hereinafter cited as Third Kefauver Report]; Johnson,
Organized Crime: Challenge to the American Legal System, 53 J. Crim. L.C. &
127 (1963); President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of
Justice, The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society (1967) [hereinafter cited as The
Challenge of Crime].
2 The Kefauver Committee found evidence of infiltration by organized criminals into
at least 50 separate industries in 1951. Third Kefauver Report 171. See E. Kefauver,
Crime in America 16 (1961), quoted in Johnson, supra note I, at 403.
3 E.g., to preclude possible prosecution for tax fraud of its members, a criminal
organization might establish a legitimate business operation to which illegal profits from
gambling or narcotics traffic could be attributed and reported as legal income from the
operation of the business. "[T]o have a legitimate business enables the racket executive
to . • . establish a source of funds that appears legal and upon which just enough taxes
can be paid to avoid income tax prosecution." The Challenge of Crime, supra note 1, at
189.
4 "Organized crime invests the profit it has made from illegal service activities in
a variety of businesses throughout the country." The Challenge of Crime, supra note 1,
at 189-90.
5 "[Viol/ use the same kind of service facilities to maintain various types of
gambling equipment that you use to maintain a perfectly legitimate jukebox or a
perfectly legitimate cigarette vendor . . .." Johnson, supra note 1, at 405, n.41.
"Testimony about coin-machine operations in Gary, Ind., and New Orleans, La.,
established that industry participation gave to criminals the opportunity to obtain
licenses for short-wave radio stations allegedly to dispatch vehicles servicing coin
machines, but actually to disseminate racetrack results in furtherance of illegal book-
making activities." Id. at 405-6.
"[T]rucking operations in some instances give gangsters access to the waterfront,
where they can facilitate smuggling of narcotics. The importation of narcotics is also
sometimes covered through import-export businesses . . . ." Id. at 406 n.41.
° Sec Preamble to Fla. Stat. Ann. ch. 69-272.
7 Fla. Stat. Ann. ch. 32, §§ 932.58-60 (1969).
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corporate officers, directors, employees, agents or stockholders, in con-
ducting the corporation's affairs, engage in certain illegal activities
with the knowledge of the president and a majority of the directors,
with the intent to compel or induce other persons or corporations to
deal with such corporation or engage in such illegal activity. 8 Second,
the corporate charter may be forfeited when any corporate officer or
any other person "controlling" the corporation, with the knowledge
of the president and a majority of the directors, engages in certain
illegal activities or is "connected directly or indirectly" with "orga-
nizations" engaging in such illegal activities.° Third, the operation of
any business other than a corporation may be enjoined when any
person in control of the business, in conducting its business affairs,
engages in certain illegal conduct, with the intent to compel or induce
other persons or corporations to deal with such business or engage
in such illegal conduct!'
The provision for forfeiture of the corporate charter because
of an agent's unlawful acts are set forth in section 932.58(a) of the
Florida Statutes. This section is unique in that it seeks to combat organ-
ized crime in a manner never before attempted. After suggesting why
organized crime has not been contained by existing laws this comment
will examine the constitutional validity, and the practical viability,
of the new Florida statute.
I. THE INEFFECTIVENESS OF EXISTING LAWS
The extent to which organized crime has infiltrated into the
actual operation and control of legitimate business indicates that ex-
isting laws have not been effective. This ineffectiveness may be di-
rectly attributable to the inability of the laws themselves to "pierce
the corporate veil" of the criminal organization!' The structure of
8 Fla. Stat. Ann. § 932.38(b).
° Fla. Stat. Ann. § 932.58(a).
'° Fla. Stat. Ann. § 932.59.
11 The ineffectiveness of existing law may be caused by either "uninspired" enforce-
ment or by inadequacies in the laws themselves. The term "uninspired" enforcement,
relates to dishonesty, bribery, coercion, etc. of policemen, police officials, attorneys, judges
and other public officials charged with the duty of enforcement and administration of
the law. The term inadequacy of the law as used in this comment refers not only to the
fact that a particular law may not extend its coverage to certain persons or actions, but
also to the fact that the person who is reached by the law can avoid its effective use
by such methods as intimidation and coercion of witnesses, or simply by devising methods
to stay within the letter of the law while continuing to violate the spirit of the law.
See for example the discussion concerning the application of tax law to control organized
crime, at p. 977-78 infra.
These two causes of ineffectiveness of existing law go hand in hand; if the laws
are inadequate, the most diligent and honest law enforcement machinery will be severely
handicapped; if the machinery is "uninspired," even fully adequate laws will be of
little value. Since the most important of these two factors is the adequacy of the laws
themselves, this comment will assume that law enforcement agencies are both diligent
and honest, and the inquiry will concern the laws themselves operating under ideal con-
ditions.
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organized crime parallels that of the military in that it is highly
stratified. Therefore, the criminal organization leaders are "insulated
by several layers of underlings from the actual physical acts which
constitute criminal offenses committed by the organization!'" The
use of direct substantive criminal statutes in an attempt to control
organized crime only results in removing "employees" of the organ-
ization while management is left unaffected." As long as the "em-
ployees" can be replaced easily, the effect of the substantive statutes
on the operations of the criminal organization is minimal. One pos-
sible way of reaching beyond the employees is by using the conspiracy
doctrine," which is specifically designed to reach the planner as well
as the perpetrator of an unlawful act. It has been pointed out that
prosecution for conspiracy presents an attractive opportunity for law
enforcement officials to convict the leaders of organized crime because
of the substantial reduction in standards of proof required in a con-
spiracy trial.' However, while a conspiracy prosecution may be suc-
cessful in a "minor" case, for example, gambling or prostitution, the
penalties attached do not present a serious threat to the continued
existence of organized crime. Moreover, the supposed ease of convic-
tion in a conspiracy case may be frustrated altogether in a case in-
volving a more serious charge, such as murder, because of organized
crime's ability to intimidate and discourage potential witnesses from
testifying.
The reluctance and refusal of witnesses to testify is caused by
12
 Johnson, supra note 1, at 416. In discussing the form and structure of organized
crime, Mr. Johnson notes that lower echelon members of a criminal organization, such
as gunmen or pushers can be easily replaced, much as minor employees in any business
operation. Such persons are unimportant individually to the continued operation or
success of the organization. As an individual moves upward through the hierarchy of
the organization it becomes increasingly difficult to replace him. Yet, as Mr. Johnson
states, "as the ease of replacement of a member of a criminal organization decreases,
the probability that he can be prosecuted successfully also decreases." Id.
35
 When using substantive criminal statutes "it is the hands, not the brains of an
organization which commit the overt act and are caught if anyone is." Id. at 416.
14 "Conspiracy is commonly defined as 'a combination between two or more
persons to do or accomplish a criminal or unlawful act, or to do a lawful act by criminal
or unlawful means.'" Note, 62 Harv. L. Rev. 277 (1948). For a discussion of the
use of conspiracy as a weapon against organized crime, see Johnson, supra note 1,
at 2-3.
15
 In a conspiracy trial not only can co-defendants be "prodded into accusing
or contradicting each other," but also "[i]t is difficult for the individual to make his
own case stand on its own merits in the minds of jurors who are ready to believe
that birds of a feather are flocked together." Jackson, J., concurring in Krulewitch v.
United States, 336 U.S. 440, 454 (1949). Further, heresay declarations by one or more
of the defendant's admissible against the declarant but not against the others can be
received into evidence. Thus the danger arises that the jury will disregard the limita-
tion and use the evidence against all of the co-conspirators. Id. at 442-3. In addition,
little proof of agreement is necessary, Note, 62 Harv. L. Rev. 276, 284 (1948). Finally
the courts in conspiracy cases "have shown a lenient attitude toward the prosecution
and have allowed juries to convict on an extremely low minimum of evidence."
Note, 24 Brooklyn L. Rev. 1, 9 (1957).
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the threat of violence against potential witnesses or the offering of
rewards to those who fail to testify.' The innocent observer of a
crime may be subjected to threats of serious violence against himself
or his family.17 Likewise, threats may be used against members of a
criminal organization to insure their silence.ls In contrast to the stick,
however, the organization may offer a carrot to the potential witness
in the form of a money bribe to the innocent witness and an implied
promise of advancement in the hierarchy to a member of the organ-
ization. 19
The reward-punishment tactics engaged in by organized crime to
suppress the testimony of potential witnesses is strengthened by the
high degree of loyalty which the upper echelons of organized crime
exhibit. There exists an unwritten code of silence which "makes it
almost impossible to get a member to give evidence against his
brethren . . . . 120 This code is essentially a result of the reward-
punishment tactics:
[The] code . . . is not something reduced to writing, and is
rarely even spoken about—it is second nature. Members are
only taken into the organization after they have proved their
rights to membership in some positive fashion, such as by
adherence to the code in the face of extreme danger."
Since the American system of justice relies to a large extent on
witnesses' testimony, the intimidation and bribery of potential wit-
nesses by organized crime presents an extremely serious practical
difficulty which must be overcome if conspiracy and other substantive
statutes are to be effectively employed against organized crime.
Thus, it may be concluded that given the structure of organized
crime, existing laws, in and of themselves, are essentially ineffective
in reaching management. It may also be concluded that while con-
spiracy theoretically allows for proceeding directly against manage-
ment for substantive criminal acts, in practice, the use of conspiracy
is limited because whenever the potential penalties could be a threat
to its continued existence, the resources and tactics of organized
crime render potential witness testimony useless.
Law enforcement agencies have attempted to circumvent the
obstacles presented by the structure of organized crime by prosecuting
organization leaders for tax law violations. While such tactics initially
enjoyed limited success, ironically, more convictions led to fewer pros-
ecutions because organized crime's sophisticated structure—including
18 See Johnson, supra note 1, at 417.
17 See Id. at 408 n. 55, for examples of the use of violence to silence potential wit-
nesses.
18 "The 'insiders,' the members of the organization who are involved, are little
trouble . . . The punishment meted out to them if they do turn state's evidence is
merciless and virtually inescapable." Id. at 417 D.102,
19 Id. at 417.
20 Id. at 417 n.103.
21 id.
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of ten extremely capable lawyers and accountants—created methods
by which the leaders of the organization were able to operate within
the letter of the tax law."
Although proceeding directly against the leaders of organized
crime is at times successful, the actual effect on organized crime as
a whole appears to be negligible. The convictions which are obtained
are against individuals; the loss of an individual leader does not
cripple the organization. Proceeding directly against individuals does
not appear to be the answer to the problem of organized crime as
long as the individuals can return to the organization after they have
served their sentences or paid their fines. The only way direct pro-
ceedings will have a substantial effect on the penetration of legitimate
business by organized crime would be through the unlikely possibility
of obtaining simultaneous convictions against a large number of key
leaders.
While "direct" laws fall short of posing serious difficulties to the
continued existence of organized crime, "indirect" laws may be
effective. "Indirect" laws, instead of aiming at the individual, seek
to reach the equipment with which illegal activity is carried on or the
fruits of the illegal activity, the object being to deprive organized
crime of its means of existence or to make illegal activity unprofitable.
Florida's new statute may be classified as an "indirect" law in that
its aim is to prevent organized crime from investing in or operating
business organizations in the state. The statute seeks to foreclose out-
lets for illegally acquiring funds and thus to discourage illegal ac-
tivity. Other examples of "indirect" methods are forfeiture and con-
fiscation,' and the closing of premises on which illegal activity is
carried out. ' 4 The utility of confiscation and forfeiture proceedings,
however, is clearly limited by their nature. Certain major activities of
organized crime, for example loansharking and bookmaking, are
carried on without using any materials which, if seized, would seri-
ously hamper its operations. The closing-of-premises weapon is
similarly limited, because certain criminal activities are simply not
conducted at any specific location.
It was against this background—the almost complete failure of
existing laws to adapt to the unique challenge posed by the structure
of organized crime—that the Florida legislature embarked upon a
new approach to combat the problem of organized crime—a statute
designed to eliminate investment in and control of legitimate business
by organized crime.
22 Id. at 15-18. The application of antitrust law to organized crime's legitimate
business has been suggested. See Comment, Antitrust Enforcement Against Organized
Crime, 70 Colum. L. Rev. 307 (1970). However, just as the organization adapted to
tax law prosecution, it seems likely that it could comply with the antitrust laws if
threatened by antitrust suits.
23
 Johnson, supra note 1, at 23-4.
24
 Id. at 24-5.
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IL SOURCES OF AUTHORITY FOR THE FLORIDA STATUTE
There are three possible sources of authority upon which the
new Florida law can be based: common law, state power to control
corporations, and the police power. At common law, the state can
revoke the charter of a corporation which fails to use or wilfully
misuses its state-granted franchise. 25 It can be argued that Florida's
law is merely a statutory codification of that aspect of the state's
general power under common law which allows it to revoke a cor-
porate charter which has been abused. Several cases indicate that one
implied condition in the grant of corporate power is that the corpora-
tion will not violate the criminal law, and that when this condition
is disregarded the corporate charter may be revoked. 26 Revocation
for violation of this implied condition is the thrust of section
932.58(b), which states that a charter may be revoked if the public
interest requires it and if an agent of the corporation, in conducting
the corporation's affairs, with the knowledge of the president and a
majority of the board of directors, purposely engages in a persistent
course of one of several enumerated crimes with the intent to compel
or induce other persons or corporations to deal with the corporation
or to engage in such illegal conduct. The provision does not represent
a significant departure from common law to the extent that "when
the corporation enters upon an aggressive course of lawlessness,"" its
charter may be revoked; this amounts to little more than applying
the substantive criminal law to corporations through the sanction of
forfeiture of charter.
Since, however, it is not at all clear that corporate charter's were
revoked at common law on the bases set forth in subsection (a) of the
statute, in this respect the provision may be a significant departure
from the common law of charter revocation in that it provides for
the termination of the corporate existence because of the personal
acts of an individual associated with the corporation when those who
control the corporation are aware of or should be aware of such acts.
25 See New Orleans Waterworks Co. v. Louisiana, 185 U.S. 336 (1902) ; Collins-Doan
Co. v. Collins, 3 N.J. 382, 70 A.2d 159 (1949). In the Dartmouth College case, Justice
Story painted out that "an eleemosynary [corporation], like every other corporation,
is subject to the general law of the land. It may forfeit its corporate franchises, by
misuser or non-user of them." 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 518, 675 (1819).
Quo warranto is the writ by which most states test the right of an individual
or corporation to exercise a privilege or franchise which can be exercised only by
virtue of a grant of authority from the state. See, e.g. People v. White Circle League
of America, 408 Ill. .564, 566, 97 N.E.2d 811, 814 (1951).
26 State v. French Lick Springs Hotel Co., 42 Ind. App. 282, 82 N.E. 801 (1907)
(hotel violated antigambling laws). See also State v. Nebraska Home Co., 66 Neb. 349,
92 NM. 763 (1902) (corporation conducted unlawful lottery); People v. White Circle
League of America, 408 111. 564, 97 N.E.2d 811 (1951) (corporation persistently violated
criminal libel laws).
27 State v. French Lick Springs Hotel Co., 42 Ind. App, 282, 82 N.E. 801 (1907).
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Thus, it is clear, that Florida could not completely rely on common
law to effect the objectives embodied in the statute.
That a corporation enjoys its continued existence as a privilege,
not a right granted by the state, is well-established 28
 A state exercises
control over its corporations both by granting the privilege to in-
corporate and by regulating existing corporations through an ever
growing body of statutes. In Trustees of Dartmouth College v.
Woodward,' however, the Supreme Court held that the corporate
charter was a contract between the corporation and the state, and
that certain subsequent attempts by the legislature to alter or amend
the rights of the corporation would violate the impairment of con-
tracts clause of the United States Constitution." As a direct result
of the Dartmouth College case, state legislatures began to reserve the
power to amend or repeal corporate charters." The reservation of
powers provision became part of the contract between the state and
the corporation, and the state legislature thereby obtained the right
to effect changes in the corporate charter in the form of alteration,
amendment or repeal without violating Article 1, Section 10 of the
Constitution." All but three states have constitutional or statutory
reservation of power clauses." Florida is one of the three exceptions
and thus cannot rely upon any explicit reservation of power provision
as the source of power for enacting the new law.
The third possible basis for the statute is the state police power.
In Helvering v. Northwest Steel Rolling Mills," the Supreme Court
pointed out that the states may regulate corporations through legisla-
tion which promotes the public welfare notwithstanding the provisions
of the corporate charter." Florida had the power to enact the law if
28 
"But the right to conduct business in the form of a corporation . . . is not a
natural or fundamental right. It is a creature of the law; and a state . . . may
qualify the privilege by imposing such conditions and duties as reasonably may be
deemed expedient in order that the corporation's activities may not operate to the
detriment of the rights of others with whom it may come in contact." Prudential Ins.
Co. v. Cheek, 259 U.S. 530, 536 (1922).
29 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
So U.S. Const. art. 1,	 10.
Si cr[Ilf the legislature mean to claim such an authority, [to take away powers or
control the exercise of the powers of a corporation] it must be reserved in the grant."
Story J., concurring in Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.)
518, 712 (1819). In some states the reservation of the power to alter, amend or repeal
is in the constitution; in others, the power is given by statutory provision. Greewood v.
Freight Co., 105 U.S. 13 (1881).
32
 See, e.g., Spring Valley Waterworks v. Schottler, 110 U.S. 347, 352 (1884), where
the Court stated: "In California the Constitution put this reservation into every charter,
and consequently this company was from the moment of its creation subject to the
legislative power of alteration, and, if deemed expedient, of absolute extinguishment as a
corporate body."
38
 The states which have neither constitutional nor statutory reservation of power
provisions are Florida, Hawaii and Louisiana. ABA-ALI Model Bus. Corp. Act Ann.
§ 142-2.02.
34
 311 U.S. 46 (1940).
86 Id. at 51. See also Eagle Ins. Co. v. Ohio, 153 U.S. 446 (1894).
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this statute represents a valid exercise of the state's police power. In
determining what is a valid exercise of a state's police power, the
Supreme Court has established the following test:
To justify the State in . . . interposing its authority in
behalf of the public, it must appear, first, that the interests of
the public . . . require such interference; and, second, that
the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment
of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals."
Although the "interference" which the Florida statute entails—the
elimination of organized crime from legitimate business—is certainly
within the public interest, it is not clear that the new statute con-
stitutes a reasonable method for accomplishing the intended purpose
or that the method is "not unduly oppressive upon individuals."
In Goldblatt v. Town of HemPstead," the Supreme Court up-
held a town ordinance regulating dredging and pit excavation as a
reasonable exercise of police power. The Court discussed various fac-
tors it would consider in determining "reasonableness of method:"
To evaluate its reasonableness we . . . need to know such
things as the nature of the menace against which it will pro-
tect, the availability and effectiveness of other less drastic
protective steps, and the loss which appellants will suffer
from the imposition of the ordinance."
In anplying the first of these criteria to judge the reasonableness of
the Florida statute, it can be argued that, as pointed out earlier, the
menace of organized crime is such that existing "less drastic steps" are
ineffective in protecting against it, and that therefore, new, imagina-
tive approaches are necessary. It further appears that there is no
other method which would effectively preclude organized crime from
using corporate status as a vehicle for increasing its powerful position
in the American economy.
In examining the "loss" suffered under the statute it is important
to note that the section provides for forfeiture of the corporate
charter because of the acts of an individual associated with the cor-
poration. In De Veau v. Braistead," the Supreme Court held that a
New York statute which prohibited felons from collecting dues as
union officers at the waterfront was constitutional. The Court found
that the statute was reasonably related to eliminating the corruption
that prevailed at the waterfront. In De Veau, then, the Supreme
Court found reasonable a state statute which prohibited an individual
"connected" with crime—through a felony conviction—from engag-
ing in a particular business activity. The statute, however, does not
86 Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594-5 (1962), quoting from
Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 137 (1894).
87 369 U.S. 590 (1962).
38 Id. at 595.
30 363 U.S. 144 (1960).
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simply prohibit certain individuals from engaging in business, it also
revokes the power of the corporations with which these individuals
are associated to do business. For this reason, the statute may be
challenged as being "unduly oppressive" to those associated with the
corporation who have no connections whatsoever with organized
criminal activities. It is submitted that, to the extent that the number
of alternatives which will effectively implement a legitimate state
interest decrease, the "loss" criterion should correspondingly be ac-
corded less weight. Thus, with respect to the Florida statute, the
"loss" criterion may not be controlling.
It is difficult to determine whether the far-reaching aspects of
section 932.58(a) will lead the courts to conclude that the statute is
an unreasonable exercise of the state's police power, or whether the
statute will be upheld not only because it bears a rational relationship
to the solution of a problem which is properly within the state's sphere
of interest, but also because it arguably represents the sole method
of effectively protecting that interest.
III. VAGUENESS
It is well settled that a state criminal statute which is overly
vague violates the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment."
It has been observed that, with the exception of one unique case, "no
vagueness attack on a noncriminal statute has succeeded." 41 Pre-
sumably, one reason for the different treatment of civil statutes is
that they do not carry the serious penalties which are often found in
criminal statutes.' If the Florida legislature's classification of its
new statute as a civil statute is accepted, the conclusion would follow
that a successful challenge to its constitutional validity on grounds of
vagueness is unlikely. Nevertheless, there is some doubt as to whether
the new statute should be characterized as civil or criminal." For
purposes of this discussion, it will be assumed that the law is criminal
in nature. If it can survive an attack on the ground that it is un-
constitutionally vague under criminal law standards, then it will prob-
ably survive such an attack if characterized as civil in nature.
One often quoted reason why a statute will be held to be uncon-
stitutionally vague is that the terms of the statute cannot be under-
stood by men of "common" intelligence so as to give fair warning to
judge, attorney and individual alike as to what conduct is prohibited."
40 See generally Comment, Due Process Requirements of Definiteness in Statutes,
62 Harv. L. Rev. 77 (1948); Comment, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Su-
preme Court, 109 U. Pa. L. Rev. 67 (1960).
41
 Comment, 109 U. Pa. L. Rev. at 70 n.16.
42 "Ent is probable that a statute imposing penal sanctions will be looked at more
severely than one whose operation is of less drastic effect . . .." Id.
43
 See discussion infra at 985.
44
 Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939); Cline v. Prink Dairy Co., 274 U.S.
445 (1927); Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385 (1926).
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The Supreme Court has indicated, however, that absolute precision
is not always required:
Few words possess the precision of mathematical symbols,
most statutes must deal with unforeseen variations in factual
situations, and the practical necessities of discharging the
business of government inevitably limit the specificity with
which legislators can spell out prohibition."
Unfortunately, except for such broad policy statements the courts
have not articulated a precise standard by which it can be determined
whether a term is or is not unconstitutionally vague." It is clear,
however, that the process involves, a balancing of individual rights
against the economic and social benefits of pursuing a particular state
policy. Perhaps because of this balancing process, cases involving chal-
lenges upon vagueness grounds exhibit "an habitual lack of inform-
ing reasoning." 47 Because of a dearth of articulated standards, it is
necessary to decide the vagueness issue on a case-by-case approach.
Examining the Florida statute without the aid of clearly articu-
lated standards is not a futile exercise if the underlying balancing
process between individual rights and public needs is concentrated
upon. Given the intent of the Florida legislature to deprive "organized"
crime of the benefits of engaging in legitimate business in Florida,
the most critical word in the statute is "organized." Moreover, "or-
ganized" is the most difficult word in the statute to define and, there-
fore, is the most susceptible to a successful constitutional challenge.
It is important to note that while the legislature refers to "or-
ganized crime" in the preamble to the statute, subsection (a) enu-
merates specific crimes such as "organized" gambling, and "organized"
extortion. In specifying particular forms of organized crime the
legislature was undoubtedly attempting to add certainty to the stat-
ute. However, the term "organized" was not directly defined by the
legislature.
The term "organized" crime has been used primarily in the years
since the Kefauver Commission of 1951.48 The various terms which
are of ten substituted for "organized" crime including mafia," "syn-
dicate," "mob" or "outfit" are no clearer in meaning. "Organized"
crime is something which everyone knows exists, yet virtually no
one has full knowledge of its scope, or of who is actually involved.
The President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administra-
45 Boyce Motor Lines v. United States, 342 U.S. 337, 340 (1952). See also State
v. Dennis, 80 N.J. Super. 411, 194 Aid 3, 7 (1963), where the court stated: "Where
the legislative regulatory object is appropriate and the conduct intended to be prohibited
is not fairly susceptible of definition in other than general language, there is no con-
stitutional impediment to its use."
46 Comment, 109 U. Pa. L. Rev. at 72-3.
47 Id. at 70-1.
48 See note 1 supra.
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tion of Justice in 1967" set forth no clear definition but did suggest
several key attributes which "organized" crime possesses, including
permanancy of membership (as opposed to ad hoc groups formed to
commit a single crime), very close organization and strict discipline.
The difficulty of proposing a meaningful definition of organized crime
is illustrated by the futile attempt of forty law enforcement officials,
university professors of criminology, sociologists, systems engineers
and other experts who developed the following definition which is "still
accepted as the best":
Organized crime is the product of a self-perpetuating crim-
inal conspiracy to bring exorbitant profits from our society
by any means—fair or foul, legal and illegal. Despite person-
nel changes, the conspirational entity continues. It survives
on fear and corruption. By one or another means, it obtains
a high degree of immunity from the law. It is totalitarian in
its organization. A way of life, it imposes rigid discipline on
underlings who do the dirty work while the top men of or-
ganized crime are generally insulated from the criminal act
and the consequent danger of prosecution."
This definition conveys the same ideas as did the President's
Commission as to the nature of organized crime, concluding that it
includes at least the characteristics of permanence, a high degree of
structural organization, and strict discipline. When broken down in
this manner, the term takes on a certain degree of meaning. At least
the one-time burgler (unless of course he disposes of his ill-gotten gain
through a criminal organization) can be excluded. It also would ex-
clude the one-time conspiracy made up of criminals on an ad hoc
basis, who have little organization and no need for the methods of
strict discipline or enforcement used by organized crime.
The line between "organized" and "non-organized" crime may
not always be crystal clear but the distinction embodied in the defini-
tion of organized crime is a rational one. Just as the doctrine of
conspiracy recognizes that there is more danger to the public from
group criminal activity than from individual activity, so the concept
of organized crime recognizes the greatly increased danger to the
public from a highly structured permanent organization of criminals
as compared to non-organized individual or group action.
Another factor which should be considered in deciding whether
a statute is unconstitutionally vague is the scope of alternatives the
legislature could have employed. With regard to the term "organized,"
it appears that the Florida legislature could have substituted the char-
acteristics which the President's crime commission report set forth.
But this substitution arguably would not have a clarifying effect at
4° See note 1 supra.
5° Grutzner, How to Lock Out the Mafia, 48 Harv. Bus. Rev. 45, 47 (1970), quoting
from Salerno & Tompkins, The Crime Confederation 303 (1969).
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all, because the term "organized" does nothing more than provide
one word to summarize the several attributes of permanence of mem-
bership, rigid structure and strict discipline. The prosecutor will have
the same characteristics to prove in either case, and it is not clear
that the statute will describe any more precisely what conduct a
potential defendant must avoid.
If no substitutes are available for the word "organized" which
would in fact clarify the issue, the courts must face squarely the
question of whether or not the sacrifice of individual rights in this
particular case is violative of the due process clause when balanced
against the needs of the public in attempting to eradicate organized
crime. The importance of this balancing process should not be taken
lightly, for the court, by striking down this statute on vagueness
grounds, may at the same time be curtailing any further legislative
attempts to regulate the particular conduct involved,51 thus dulling the
"legislative appetite for dealing with new problems on an experimental
basis."52
It is submitted that the need for controlling organized crime
should outweigh the fact that individuals at times may be required to
make a "calculated guess" as to whether their conduct violates the
provision of the statute. This would not be an unprecedented approach
to take, for as Justice Holmes observed:
The law is full of instances where a man's fate depends on
his estimating rightly, that is as the jury subsequently esti-
mates it, some matter of degree. If his judgment is wrong
not only may he incur a fine he may incur the penalty of
death.53
The Florida legislature in subsection (a) set forth an innovative
experimental approach to the pervasive problem of controlling or-
ganized crime. In choosing between limiting individual rights and the
economic and social policy involved, it would appear that better judg-
ment would favor the latter.
IV. THE CIVIL-CRIMINAL DICHOTOMY
The New York Times described Florida's new law as "the first
piece of civil legislation in the country which names organized crime
as its target." 54 Florida's Attorney General has said that the legislature
decided to combat organized crime through the civil courts rather
than the criminal courts because of "the frustration of [criminal] law
enforcement people throughout the nation." 55 It seems clear that FIor-
51 See Comment, 62 Nary. L. Rev. 77, 82-83 (1948); United States v. Petrillo, 332
U.S. 1, 7 (1947).
52 Comment, supra note 51, at 83; see Frankfurter, J., dissenting in Winters v. New
York, 333 U.S. 507, 536 (1947).
53 Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373, 377 (1913)
54 N.Y. Times, Oct. 20, 1969, at 10, col. 2 (city ed.).
55 Id.
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ida at least in part framed this civil statute in order to take advan-
tage of important procedural and evidentary standards that would
not be available in a criminal case against organized crime."
Even though the statute has been denominated as civil by the
Florida legislature, it is arguable that the statute seeks to penalize
individuals involved in various types of organized crime for violations
of the criminal law through the civil process by forfeiting the charters
of corporations with which these individuals are connected. If this
position is accepted, the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment, as interpreted by the Supreme Court in a recent line of cases,
may invalidate the statute. One commentator has pointed out that
[i]n the light of recent ... constitutional developments and
the exhortation of the Supreme Court . . . "a State cannot
foreclose the exercise of constitutional rights by mere labels"
the legal profession must awaken to the realization that the
difference between "civil" and "criminal" cannot rest on ar-
bitrary labeling by courts and legislatures, but requires care-
ful re-examination of legal consequences to distinguish reality
from fiction. 57
The Supreme Court has in several recent cases extended certain
constitutional protections traditionally available only in "criminal"
proceedings to proceedings which have been denominated as "civil."
In One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania"' the Supreme Court
held that evidence obtained in violation of the fourth amendment was
inadmissible in a proceeding to forfeit an automobile used by its
owner to transport narcotics. The Court reversed the state court which
had held that the exclusionary rule of 112app v. Ohio" applied only to
criminal prosecutions and was inapplicable to a forfeiture proceeding
which is civil in nature. The Court indicated that a forfeiture proceed-
ing is "quasi-criminal" because its object is to "penalize for the com-
mission of an offense against the [criminal] law."" The Court pointed
out that it would be "anomalous" to exclude the illegally seized evi-
dence in the criminal proceeding and admit it in the forfeiture pro-
ceeding when the forfeiture was clearly a penalty for the criminal
offense and when the owner of the automobile would suffer a greater
penalty than a conviction and fine for the criminal offense.° 1
56 The burden of proof in a civil case, for example, is lower than that in a criminal
case. Further, the scope of discovery is much broader in a civil action.
57 Fins, In Light of Recent Federal Constitutional Developments, When Is an
Illinois Proceeding "Civil" and when "Criminal"? 2 John Marshall J. of Prac. & Pro.
205, 229 (1969), quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 429 (1963).
58 One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693 (1965).
59 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
6° 380 U.S. at 700.
61
 Id. at 701. See also Finn's Liquor Shop v. State Liquor Authority, 24 N.Y.2d 647
(1969) in which the New York Court of Appeals held that illegally seized evidence was
inadmissible under Plymouth in an administrative proceeding to revoke a liquor license.
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Plymouth is applicable to cases which may arise under the Flor-
ida law because the statute provides for forfeiture of a corporate
charter when certain crimes have been committed by an individual
controlling the corporation or when such individual is connected with
organizations engaging in such criminal activities. The Florida statute
can be regarded as imposing a "penalty" on persons involved with
organized crime as a substitute for the criminal sanctions which the
state is unable to impose because of the difficulty of obtaining con-
victions against organized crime figures. If this is the object of the
Florida statute, the Plymouth reasoning would warrant the conclu-
sion that a proceeding under it is "quasi-criminal."
There may, however, be a significant distinction between the two
situations. It can be argued that Plymouth does not apply to the Flor-
ida situation because in Plymouth the forfeiture proceeding was, in
effect, against the same individual who committed the criminal offense
while under subsection (a) the forfeiture proceeding is against the
charter of a corporation with which the individual who committed the
offense is associated. This distinction, however, is not significant in that
the Florida law attempts to reach certain individuals through corpora-
tions which they control and thus the rationale of Plymouth, that an
individual cannot be punished in a civil proceeding for an underlying
criminal offense without certain protections afforded in criminal pro-
ceedings, is fully applicable.
Under the holding of Plymouth, therefore, illegally obtained evi-
dence will probably be excluded from any forfeiture proceeding
brought under the Florida law. In addition, Plymouth indicates the
Court's willingness to look closely at the civil-criminal dichotomy
and to guarantee in quasi-criminal proceedings at least some of the
protections traditionally afforded only in criminal proceedings.
In Specht v. Patterson,62
 the Supreme Court again concerned it-
self with this dichotomy. In Specht, an individual was convicted of a
sexual offense but was not sentenced under the criminal act. He was
instead committed under the Colorado Sex Offenders Act which re-
quries not only the commission of a sexual offense, but a finding that
the individual is a threat to the public or is an habitual offender and
mentally ill.' In this committment proceeding the offender was not
afforded notice, a full hearing, or the right of confrontation. The
Court held that whether the committment proceeding was denom-
inated civil or criminal, due process had not been satisfied because
"punishment" under the Sexual Offenders Act is "criminal punishment
even though it is designed not so much as retribution as it is to keep
individuals from inflicting future harm."" The Court concluded that
The Court indicated that this reasoning applies whenever the government illegally obtains
evidence. 24 N.Y.2d at 655.
62 386 U.S. 605 (1967).
63 Id. at 608.
64 Id. at 608-09.
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a defendant in such a proceeding is "entitled to the full panoply
of the relevant protections which due process guarantees in state
criminal proceedings."" Specht, therefore, arguably stands for the
proposition that Florida must afford the full panoply of due process
protections to the corporations it proceeds against under subsection
(a).aa The reasoning set forth in Specht and Plymouth should be ap-
plicable in any proceeding which may arise under the Florida statute
in that in each case—commitment, forfeiture of personal property,
and forfeiture of a corporate charter—a determination that the crim-
inal law has been violated is essential to the imposition of a "civil"
sanction.
The scope of due process protections applicable to quasi-criminal
cases was further delineated in In re Winship." In this case, the
Court explicitly stated for the first time that the due process clause
requires conviction only upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt. In
Winship the Court held that this standard applied to the adjudication
of a juvenile as a delinquent when the juvenile is charged with an act
which would constitute a crime if he were an adult." The Court rea-
soned that this standard of proof had to be applied to juvenile pro-
ceedings despite their " 'civil' label of convenience" because the
juvenile was thereby subjected to the risk of the loss of his liberty
and the stigma of "delinquency."' The Court in Winship, then, as in
Specht and Plymouth, applied a criminal standard to a proceeding
which in effect requires a determination that the criminal Iaw has
been violated before the adjudication of "guilt" under the "civil"
statute. It can be argued that this is precisely how the Florida statute
operates; if an individual is found to have violated" a criminal law the
corporation loses its charter.
The Florida law, however, can be distinguished from Specht and
Winship in that in both of these cases the Court regarded it as crucial
that the defendant's personal liberty was at stake. No individual can
lose his personal liberty under the Florida statute and it can be argued
therefore that the statute must be held to be entirely civil in nature.
Criminal punishment, however, can be effected not only through a loss
of liberty but also through the imposition of a fine. The forfeiture in
Plymouth in effect amounted to a fine, and it can be argued that the
charter forfeiture under the Florida statute constitutes a fine for
65 Id. at 609.
66 Indeed it can be argued that the Specht doctrine should apply a fortiori to the
Florida situation because in Specht the necessary conviction was obtained under the
reasonable doubt standard while the Florida Iaw requires no such conviction but pre-
sumably only a finding in the "civil" proceeding that the "illegal act" has occurred.
67 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
68
 Previously in, In re Gault, the Court held that the due process clause requires
that a juvenile be accorded "the essentials of due process and fair treatment" in an ad-
judication which may lead to the juvenile's commitment. 387 U.S. 130 (1967).
60 397 U.S. 358, 365-67 (1970).
70
 See note 66 supra.
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criminal conduct. Further, it seems that the "stigma" which will at-
tach to the individuals involved in charter revocations will be at least
as extensive as that which could attach to the juvenile in Winship.
An additional argument can be advanced to preclude the applica-
tion of the holdings in Plymouth, Specht and Winship to cases arising
under the Florida statute. There is nothing novel about the applica-
tion of both a criminal and civil sanction to the same act." Arguably
the Plymouth line of cases should not be applicable to the Florida
law because that statute is truly civil in nature. The Supreme Court
has indicated that one remedial sanction which is "characteristically
free of the punitive criminal element is revocation of a privilege vol-
untarily granted.' 1" Florida can argue that incorporation is a state-
granted privilege and that the state has a legitimate interest in
regulating corporations with regard to possible connections with or-
ganized crime. The Supreme Court has recently held, however, that
disbarment is a "punishment or penalty imposed on the lawyer" and
is therefore a proceeding of a "quasi-criminal nature."" Thus, the
Court now appears to regard the revocation of at least some state-
granted privileges as quasi-criminal proceedings. With the advent of
increased governmental regulation and the concomitant rise in the
number and importance of state-granted "privileges," it seems doubt-
ful that a state could not effectively "punish" an individual by revoca-
tion of such a privilege.
In summary, it is difficult to determine whether the Florida law
will be held to be "quasi-criminal" under the rationale of Plymouth,
Specht, and Winship. In all of these cases as well as under the statute,
it is necessary to determine that the criminal law has been violated
before the civil sanction can be imposed. On the other hand, as noted
above, the Florida law can be distinguished from these cases on
several grounds. It is clear that the civil-criminal issue goes directly to
the viability of the Florida statute. If, for example, Winship is held to
apply, one of the statute's critical weapons against organized crime
will be lost. The state will not be able to proceed under the pre-
ponderance of the evidence standard, but only under the proof beyond
a reasonable doubt standard." Despite the broad language of Specht,
71 See, e.g., Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391 (1938). The issue was whether the
defendant was subjected to double jeopardy when he was acquitted of willful tax evasion
but was subsequently assessed the deficiency plus 50% for fraud and intentionally evading
taxes. The Court held that there was no double jeopardy because the latter was a civil
sanction of a remedial character.
72 Id. at 399.
78 In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 550-51 (1968). In Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511
(1967), the Court held that a lawyer was entitled to the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion in a disciplinary proceeding which would have led only to disbarment for soliciting.
The Court indicated that depriving a lawyer of the right to practice law is a "penalty."
Id, at 514-15. For a good discussion of these cases see Fins, supra note 57, at 214-16.
74 An interesting and important issue which may arise if the Florida statute is held
to be quasi-criminal for some purposes will be whether due process requires that the
scope of discovery under the statute be limited to that available in a criminal proceeding.
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it is not clear how far the Court will go in extending, in quasi-criminal
proceedings, protections traditionally associated with criminal cases."
Since the Florida statute was specifically designed to take advantage
of civil standards, to the degree that the protections afforded in crim-
inal prosecutions are extended, the Florida statute is rendered in-
effective.
CONCLUSION
Organized crime has proved to be durable, in part because of its
high resistance to traditional methods of crime control. Florida has
taken an imaginative approach which has the potential to frustrate
the growth of organized crime by denying it access to legitimate
business. The Florida statute, however, may be held to be an uncon-
stitutional denial of due process under the fourteenth amendment on
any of three grounds. First, the statute may be an unreasonable exer-
cise of the police power because of its far-reaching effect. Second, the
statute may be held to be void for vagueness because the term "or-
ganized" is not sufficiently clear. Finally, the practical value of the
statute may be lessened because the constitutional protections asso-
ciated with criminal proceedings may be required in proceedings under
the statute. It is hoped that even if a constitutional challenge is success-
ful, further legislative attempts to adapt the law to meet the unique
problem posed by organized crime will not be discouraged.
ROBERT P. CRONIN
RAYMOND J. BRASSARD
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 For a discussion of the various protections afforded in criminal cases which may
be extended to quasi-criminal proceedings, see Fins, supra note 57 at 225-29.
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